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Abstract
We identify a class of linearly constrained nonlinear optimization
problems with corner point optimal solutions. These include some
special polynomial fractional optimization problems with an objective
function equal to the product of some power functions of positive linear
functionals subtracting the sum of some power functions of positive lin-
ear functionals, divided by the sum of some power functions of positive
linear functionals. The powers are required to be all positive integers,
and the aggregate power of the product is required to be no larger
than the lowest power in both of the two sums. The result has appli-
cations to some optimization problems under uncertainty, particularly
in finance.
Key words: linear constraints, non-linear optimization, polynomial frac-
tional optimization, corner point optimal solutions.
1
Introduction
It is well known that when the objective function and constraints of an
optimization problem are all linear, the search for the optimal solution is
greatly simplified so that we need only consider corner-point feasible (here-
after CPF) solutions. While we all know that this simplification, in general,
does not work for a problem with a nonlinear objective function, we ask the
question what conditions are needed to make it work. Surprisingly, little has
been said about this in the literature. In this paper we try to fill this gap
and identify a class of linearly constrained nonlinear optimization problems
which have corner point optimal solutions.
As expectations are linear in probabilities, we can naturally find applica-
tions of the above result to some optimization problems under uncertainty.
In particular, we present some examples to show how this result helps to
solve some interesting problems in finance. For example, we use the above
result to investigate the effects of background risk and wealth inequality on
downside risk aversion.
This paper is related to the studies on linearly constrained nonlinear
optimization problems in general. There is an extensive literature on this
topic though its focus is primarily on numerical algorithms for this class of
optimization problems.1 In particular, this paper is related to the studies
on linearly constrained polynomial and polynomial fractional optimization
problems.2 Moreover, this paper is related to the work of Charnes and
Cooper (1962) who show that linear fractional optimization problems can
1There are well over 400 different solution algorithms in solving different kinds of
linearly constrained optimization problems. See, for example, Kalantari (1985), Parpas et
al. (2006), Zhang and Wang (2008), and Jeyakumar and Li (2011).
2See, for example, Jeyakumar and Li (2011).
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be transformed to linear optimization problems.
The paper is also related to some studies on decision making under
uncertainty, in particular, the recent advancements in the theory of downside
risk aversion.3 Moreover, the paper is also closely related to the work of
Gollier and Kimball (1996) who develop a diffidence theorem which can solve
a large set of problems related to the effects of uncertainty on preferences.
The diffidence theorem deals with the situation where functions are all linear
in probabilities while our result is useful in the non-linear situation.
1 Two Lemmas
In this section we establish two lemmas which are crucial to the derivation
of our main results in the next section. Let x = (x1, ..., xk) ∈ Rk. Let
fi(x) and gj(x) be linear functions of x1, ..., xk, i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., m.




[fi(x)]si ≤ (<)Πmi=1[gi(x)]ti. (1)
Let s¯ = maxi{si} and t = ∑mi=1 ti. Following convention, let C s¯s and
P (s¯, s) denote the number of s-combinations and the number of s-permutations







denote the set of all s-combinations and the set of all s-permutations of
{1, 2, ..., s¯} respectively, where s ≤ s¯. Let [ {1, ..., s¯}








denote the set of all permutations of t =
∑m
i=1 ti numbers chosen from
{1, 2, ..., s¯}, where the order of the elements in each pair of the round brack-
3See the list of studies on downside risk aversion mentioned in Section 3.
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ets does not matter. Let A be a non-empty subset of Rk. We first present
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume min{s1, ..., sn} ≥ t =∑mi=1 ti, and for all x ∈ A, fi(x) ≥
0, gj(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, j = 1, 2, ...,m. Inequality (1) is true for every
x ∈ A if and only if the following inequality is true for all xk ∈ A, k = 1, ..., s¯,































Proof: See Appendix A.
Due to the generality of Lemma 1 in terms of the number of elements
involved, its proof requires complicated calculations; in particular, it involves
calculations of combinations, permutations, and their mixtures. But the
idea of the proof can be explained using the following simple example where
the number of elements involved is small. Consider the special case where
n = m = 2 and s1 = s2 = 2, t1 = t2 = 1. In this case (1) becomes
(f1(x))2 + (f2(x))2 ≤ (<)g1(x)g2(x), (3)
and (2) becomes
f1(x1)f1(x2) + f2(x1)f2(x2) ≤ (<)12[g1(x
1)g2(x2) + g1(x2)g2(x1)] (4)
4Throughout this paper, k in the expression xk is not a power; it is a superscript
instead.
4
If (4) is true for all x1, x2 ∈ A, then letting x1 = x2 = x, we conclude
that (3) is true for all x ∈ A. Thus we need only show that the con-
verse is true. To show this, as arithmetic mean is larger than geometric










(f1(x2))2 + (f2(x2))2. Now applying
Cauchy’s inequality we obtain that the above expression is larger than
f1(x1)f1(x2) + f2(x1)f2(x2). This proves that if (3) is true for all x ∈ A
then (4) is true for all x1, x2 ∈ A. This completes the proof of this special
case.
Let Σ be the set of feasible solutions from some given linear constraints
on x. Assume Σ is nonempty, bounded and closed. Let Σc be the set
of corner-point feasible (hereafter CPF) solutions. We have the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Inequality (2) is true for all xi ∈ Σ, i = 1, ..., s¯, if and only if it
is true for all xi ∈ Σc, i = 1, ..., s¯, where s¯ = maxi{si}.



































i=1 ti. As f(x
1, ..., xs¯) is continuous and Σ is bounded and






We now assert that the optimal value can be achieved at a feasible solution
(x1∗, ..., xs¯∗) such that x1∗, ..., xs¯∗ ∈ Σc, i.e., x1∗, ..., xs¯∗ are CPF solutions.
This can be shown as follows. Let (x1◦, ..., xs¯◦) be an optimal solution.
Suppose xi◦ is not a CPF solution. Then we must be able to replace it with
a CPF solution. To see this, consider the following minimization problem:
min
xi∈Σ
f(x1◦, ..., x(i−1)◦, xi, x(i+1)◦, ..., xs¯◦).
It is clear that f(x1◦, ..., x(i−1)◦, xi, x(i+1)◦, ..., xs¯◦) is a linear function of
xi. Thus this minimization problem is a linear programming problem.
Hence we must be able to achieve the optimal solution at a CPF solution
xi∗ = (xi∗1 , ..., xi∗k ) ∈ Σc. This proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
2 Main Results
We are now ready to present our main theorem.
Theorem 1 Assumemin{s1, ..., sn} ≥∑mi=1 ti, where n,m, s1, ..., sn, t1, ..., tm
are all positive integers, and for all x ∈ Σ, fi(x) ≥ 0, gj(x) ≥ 0, i =
1, 2, ..., n, j = 1, 2, ...,m. Then the following two statements are true.
1. Inequality (1) is true for every x ∈ Σ, if and only if it is true for every
x ∈ Σc.
2. If there does not exist x ∈ Σ such that f1(x) = 0, f2(x) = 0, ...,
fl(x) = 0, and for all x ∈ Σ, Πmi=1(gi(x))ti−
∑n
i=l+1(fi(x))
si ≥ 0, then,










Proof: We first prove Statement 1. Applying Lemma 1 (with A = Σ), we
conclude that inequality (1) is true for every x ∈ Σ if and only if inequality
(2) is true for all xi ∈ Σ, i = 1, ..., s¯, where s¯ = maxi{si}. Applying Lemma
2, we conclude that inequality (2) is true for all xi ∈ Σ, i = 1, ..., s¯, if and
only if it is true for all xi ∈ Σc, i = 1, ..., s¯. The above two statements imply
that inequality (1) is true for every x ∈ Σ if and only if inequality (2) is true
for all xi ∈ Σc, i = 1, ..., s¯. Now applying Lemma 1 again (with A = Σc), we
obtain that inequality (2) is true for all xi ∈ Σc, i = 1, ..., s¯, if and only if
inequality (1) is true for every x ∈ Σc. The last two statements immeadiately
lead to the conclusion that inequality (1) is true for every x ∈ Σ if and only
if it is true for every x ∈ Σc. This proves the first statement.
To prove the second statement, note that as Σ is closed, for all x ∈ Σ,
fi(x) ≥ 0, and there does not exist x ∈ Σ such that f1(x) = 0, ..., fl(x) = 0,∑l
i=1(fi(x))
si must be bounded away from zero. As Σ is closed and bounded,


















≥ α. But this inequality cannot




















Applying the first statement, we conclude that for all x ∈ Σ, the above










> α, which causes
a contradiction. This proves the second statement. Q.E.D.
The second statement of the above theorem shows that if the nonlinear
objective function of the minimization problem has the required feature,
then the search for the solution to the nonlinear minimization problem is
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greatly simplified such that we need only consider CPF solutions.
In Theorem 1 the exponents s1, ..., sn, t1, ..., tm are required to be inte-
gers. This requirement can be relaxed for some cases. We have the following
result.
Proposition 1 Let s ≥ ∑mi=1 ti, where s, and ti, i = 1, ...m, are positive
real numbers, and for all x ∈ Σ, f1(x) ≥ 0, gj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, ..., m. Then
the following two statements are true.
1. The following inequality is true for every x ∈ Σ, if and only if it is
true for every x ∈ Σc:
[f1(x)]s ≤ Πmi=1[gi(x)]ti. (6)












Proof: We only show the proof of the first statement. Then as in Theorem
1, the second statement is implied by the first statement.
As the necessity is obvious, we need only prove the sufficiency. From
Theorem 1, it is straightforward that if t1s , ...,
tm
s are rational, Proposition 1
is valid. Rewrite (6) as
f1(x) ≤ Πmi=1[gi(x)]ti/s. (8)




s are irrational. Without loss of generality, suppose
tm
s is irra-
tional. Construct a sequence {δj |j = 1, 2, ...}, where δj > 0, j = 1, 2, ...,
and limj→∞ δj = 0. We have, for all x ∈ Σc,
f1(x)
Πm−1i=1 [gi(x) + δj ]ti/s
< [gm(x) + δj ]tm/s, j = 1, 2, ....
8
We can construct a sequence of rational numbers {vmj |vmj > tm/s, j =
1, 2, ...} such that limj→∞ vmj = tm/s and for all x ∈ Σc,5
f1(x)
Πm−1i=1 [gi(x) + δj ]ti/s
< (1 + δj)[gm(x) + δj ]vmj , j = 1, 2, ....
After this, if tm−1s is irrational we can do the same as above. That is,
with the same argument we can construct a sequence of rational numbers
{v(m−1)j |v(m−1)j > tm−1/s, j = 1, 2, ...} such that limj→∞ v(m−1)j = tm−1/s
and for all x ∈ Σc, j = 1, 2, ...,
f1(x)
Πm−2i=1 [gi(x) + δj ]ti/s(1 + δj)[gm(x) + δj ]vmj
< (1 + δj)[gm−1(x) + δj ]v(m−1)j .
Hence by doing the same for all i = 1, ..., m, we can construct a sequence of
rational numbers {vij |vij > ti/s, i = 1, ..., l; j = 1, 2, ...} such that limj→∞ vij =
ti/s and for all x ∈ Σc, j = 1, 2, ...,
f1(x) ≤ (1 + δj)mΠmi=1[gi(x+ δj)]vij . (9)
As Theorem 1 implies that the above inequality is valid for all x ∈ Σ, letting
j →∞ in (9), we immediately conclude that (8) is valid for all x ∈ Σ. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 can be further extended; we have the following result.
5We need only require that 0 < vmj − tm/s < − ln (1+δj )ln δj ; then, we have
(1 + δj)[gm(x) + δj ]
vmj − [gm(x) + δj]tm/s
= [gm(x) + δj]
tm/s[(1 + δj)[gm(x) + δj ]
vmj−tm/s − 1]
≥ [gm(x) + δj]tm/s[(1 + δj)δvmj−tm/sj − 1]
≥ [gm(x) + δj]tm/s[eln(1+δj )+(vmj−tm/s) ln δj − 1] > 0.
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Proposition 2 For θ ∈ [a, b], assume t(θ) ≥ 0 is a continuous function
and H(θ) is a cumulative probability distribution function.6 Assume for all
x ∈ Σ, f1(x) > 0, for all x ∈ Σ and all θ ∈ [a, b], g(x, θ) ≡ ν0(θ)+ ν1(θ)x1+
... + νk(θ)xk > 0, where νi(θ) is a continuous function of θ, i = 0, 1, ..., k.
Then the following two statements are true.
1. If s ≥ ∫ ba t(θ)dH(θ) then, the following inequality is true for every
x ∈ Σ, if and only if it is true for every x ∈ Σc:∫ b
a
t(θ) ln g(x, θ)dH(θ)≥ s ln f1(x) + α, (10)
where α is a constant.





≥ ∫ ba t(θ)dH(θ),













Proof: Similar to Proposition 1, we need only prove the first statement, as
the second statement is implied by the first statement.
We need only prove the sufficiency. Note that as both t(θ) and ln g(x, θ)
are continuous functions of θ and H(θ) is an increasing and bounded func-
tion, the Riemann-Stieltjes integral
∫ b
a t(θ) ln g(x, θ)dH(θ) exists.
Suppose (10) is valid for all x ∈ Σc. We construct a sequence of partitions
of [a, b]: Pi = {θi1 = a, θi2, ..., θi(ji−1), θiji = b}, i = 1, 2, ..., such that Pi+1
is finer than Pi and limi→∞mesh(Pi) = 0. As t(θ) is continuous, let θ◦ij ∈
[θi(j−1), θij ] be such that t(θ◦ij)(H(θij) − H(θi(j−1))) =
∫ θij
θi(j−1) t(θ)dH(θ).













t(θ◦ij) lng(x, θij)∆H(θij) =
∫ b
a
t(θ) ln g(x, θ)dH(θ),






t(θ◦ij) ln g(x, θij)∆H(θij)−
∫ b
a
t(θ) ln g(x, θ)dH(θ)|, i = 1, 2, ....
From the definition of Riemann-Stieltjes integral, we have limi→∞ δi = 0,
and from (10), we also have for all x ∈ Σc,
ji∑
j=1
t(θ◦ij) ln g(x, θij)∆H(θij)− s ln f1(x)− α ≥ −δi. (12)
Rewriting the last inequality, we obtain that for all x ∈ Σc,
Πjij=1[g(x, θij)]
t(θ◦ij)∆H(θij) ≥ eα−δi [f1(x)]s, i = 1, 2, ....
As s ≥ ∫ ba t(θ)dH(θ) = ∑jij=1 t(θ◦ij)∆H(θij), applying Proposition 1, we
immediately conclude that the above inequality is valid for all x ∈ Σ. This
inequality is equivalent to (12). Letting i → ∞ in (12), we conclude that
(10) is valid for all x ∈ Σ. Q.E.D.
3 Applications
3.1 Optimization Under Uncertainty
The results obtained in the last section can be extended to optimization un-
der uncertainty. Let Ω be the set of random variables that satisfy Ewi(˜) =
0, i = 1, ..., ν, where w1(x), ..., wν(x) are linearly independent functions.
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Assume Ω is nonempty. Let Ων+1 be the set of random variables with
(ν + 1)-point distributions that satisfy Ewi(˜) = 0, i = 1, ..., ν.
We only present the extension of Theorem 1. Proposition 1 and Propo-
sition 2 can be extended in the same way.
Proposition 3 Assumemin{s1, ..., sn} ≥∑mi=1 ti, where n,m, s1, ..., sn, t1, ..., tm
are all positive integers. Given nonnegative functions ui(x) and vj(x) with
expectations Eui(˜) and Evi(˜) well defined for all ˜ ∈ Ω, where i = 1, ..., n,
j = 1, ..., m, the following two statements are true.7
1. The following inequality is true for all ˜ ∈ Ω, if and only if it is true
for all ˜ ∈ Ων+1.
n∑
i=1
[Eui(˜)]si ≤ Πmi=1[Evi(˜)]ti. (13)
2. If there does not exist ˜ ∈ Ω such that Eu1(˜) = 0, ..., Eul(˜) = 0, and
for all ˜ ∈ Ω, Πmi=1(vi(˜))ti−
∑n
i=l+1(Eui(˜))
si ≥ 0 then, min˜∈Ω Γ(˜) =










The proof is almost the same as the proof in the linear case which can be
found in any textbook on optimization under uncertainty; thus it is omitted
for brevity. In the next section, we apply the above result to some interesting
problems in finance.
3.2 Applications in Finance
In the recent literature on decision making under uncertainty, downside risk
aversion has attracted considerable attention. Given a strictly increasing
7It is trivial to extend the above result to the case with inequality constraints. Thus
it is omitted for brevity.
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and concave utility function u(x), three downside risk aversion measures are
proposed in the literature, namely the prudence measure P (x) = −u′′′(x)u′′(x) ,
D(x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) , and the Schwarzian derivative S(x) =
u′′′(x)
u′(x) − 32R2(x), where
R(x) = −u′′(x)
u′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure.
8 The case of down-
side risk aversion is more complicated than risk aversion, and we show that
the result obtained in the last subsection is very useful when we characterize
utility functions regarding downside risk aversion.
3.2.1 Downside Risk Aversion and Background Risk
We now investigate the effect of background risk on downside risk aversion.
Given a utility function u(x), we ask the question under what conditions an
independent fair background risk ˜ always increases the Schwarzian deriva-





2.9 Let uˆ(x) = Eu(x+ ˜), which is often called
the derived utility function. The Schwarzian derivative of the derived util-





2. Thus our problem is to
characterize utility functions which satisfy the following condition









The above condition is equivalent to
E˜ = 0⇒ S(x)(Eu′(x+ ˜))2 + 3
2
(Eu′′(x+ ˜))2 ≤ Eu′′′(x+ ˜)Eu′(x+ ˜).
If for all x, S(x) ≥ 0, Proposition 3 is applicable to the above problem,
where ν = 1. Hence we immediately obtain the following result.
8See, for example, Kimball (1990), Keenan and Snow (2002, 2009, 2010), Modica and
Scarsini (2005), and Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008).
9The other two downside risk aversion measures of the derived utility function uˆ(x),
Pˆ (x) = −Eu′′′ (x+˜)Eu′′(x+˜) and Dˆ(x) = Eu
′′′(x+˜)
Eu′(x+˜) , are linear fractionals and can be easily dealt
with by applying Gollier and Kimball’s (1996) Diffidence theorem.
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2 ≥ 0. Then, the
following two conditions are equivalent.
• S(x) is increased by all fair risk ˜.
• S(x) is increased by all binary fair risk ˜, i.e., for all z ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0
S(x)[(u′(x− z)y + u′(x+ y)z)2 + 3
2
(u′′(x− z)y + u′′(x+ y)z)2]
≤ [u′(x− z)y + u′(x+ y)z][u′′′(x− z)y + u′′′(x+ y)z]. (14)
It is straightforward to extend the above result to an unfair background
risk. Moreover, from the above result we can derive a sufficient condition
(for both fair and unfair risk): S ′ ≤ 0 and S ′′ ≥ 0. The proof is omitted for
brevity.
3.2.2 Cautiousness and Background Risk
Cautiousness is defined as the ratio of prudence to risk aversion minus one,
which can be seen as a measure of downside risk aversion relative to risk
aversion.10 Given a utility function u(x), assume u′(x) < 0, u′′(x) 6= 0, and
u′′′(x) ≥ 0. Its cautiousness can be written as C(x) = u′(x)u′′′(x)
u′′2(x) − 1. This
preference measure plays an important role in the theory of risk sharing.11
Hara et al. (2011) investigate the effect of background risk on cautiousness.
Their main result is a sufficient condition under which any fair background
risk will increase cautiousness. Here we will use Proposition 3 to derive a
necessary and sufficient condition. We have the following result.
Proposition 5 The following two conditions are equivalent.
10See, for example, Huang and Stapleton (2010).
11See Leland (1980), Hara et al. (2007), and Huang and Stapleton (2010).
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• For all binary fair risk the above inequality is true, i.e., for all z ≥ 0
and y ≥ 0




[u′′(x− z)y + u′′(x+ y)z]2. (15)
Proof: Note that the inequality in the first condition is equivalent to
u′(x)u′′′(x)
u′′2(x)
[Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ Eu′(x+ ˜)Eu′′′(x+ ˜).
Thus the problem is to characterize utility functions (u(x)) which satisfy
the following condition
E˜ = 0⇒ u
′(x)u′′′(x)
u′′2(x)
[Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ Eu′(x+ ˜)Eu′′′(x+ ˜).
Thus Proposition 3 is applicable to this case. Now applying Proposition 3,
we are clear that the inequality in the first condition is true if and only if it
is true for all binary fair risk. Q.E.D.
It is straightforward to extend the above result to an unfair background
risk. Moreover, from the above result we can derive a sufficient condition
(for both fair and unfair risk): C(x) ≥ −12 , C ′(x) ≤ 0, and C ′′(x) ≥ 0. The
proof is omitted for brevity.
3.2.3 Downside Risk Aversion and Wealth Inequality
We now investigate the effect of wealth inequality on the three downside risk
aversion measures. We use a standard one-period Arrow-Debreu economy
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where all agents have the same beliefs and the same utility function u(x)
while they have different wealth. Assume that u(x) is strictly increasing
and concave and has a positive third derivative. Let different classes of
agents be indexed by θ ∈ (0,∞). The distribution of θ is characterized by a
distribution function F (θ). Let z be the future wealth per capita. Let agent
θ’s sharing rule be x(z, θ). We have Eθx(z, θ) = z, where Eθ denotes the
expectation under the distribution function F (θ). It is well known that in
this setup, an agent’s sharing rule satisfies the following condition
∂x(z, θ)
∂z
= T (x(z, θ))/Te(z), (16)
where Te(z) denotes the representative agent’s risk tolerance and T (x(z, θ))
is agent θ’s risk tolerance along her optimal payoff function.12 Moreover, the
representative agent’s risk tolerance is the mean of agents’ risk tolerance:
Te(z) = EθT (x(z, θ)). (17)
We call an economy a two-class economy if θ has a two-point distribution.
We now present the following result.
Proposition 6 Assume that all agents have the same beliefs and the same
utility function u(x) while they have different wealth. The following three
statements are true.
1. Prudence P (x) = −u′′′(x)u′′(x) is always increased by wealth inequality in
all economies if and only if it is so in all two-class economies.
2. D(x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) is increased by wealth inequality in all economies if and
only if it is so in all two-class economies.
12See, for example, Gollier (2001).
16







2 ≥ 0. Then, S(x) is increased by wealth inequality in all
economies if and only if it is so in all two-class economies.
Proof: We first prove Statement 1. Differentiating both sides of (17) w.r.t z
and noting that cautiousness is equal to the rate of change in risk tolerance,
we obtain




where Ce(z) denotes the representative agent’s cautiousness and C(x(z, θ))
is agent θ’s cautiousness along her optimal payoff function. As cautiousness
is equal to the product of prudence and risk tolerance minus one, from the
above equation we have




where Pe(z) denotes the representative agent’s prudence respectively while
P (x(z, θ)) is agent θ’s prudence. From the above equation and (16) we
obtain
Pe(z) =
Eθ[P (x(z, θ))T 2(x(z, θ))]
[EθT (x(z, θ))]2
. (18)
Thus in the first statement, the problem is to characterize utility functions
which satisfy the following condition




This condition is equivalent to
Eθx(z, θ) = z ⇒ Eθ[P (x(z, θ))T 2(x(z, θ))] ≥ P (z)[EθT (x(z, θ))]2.
It is clear that Proposition 3 is applicable to this case where ν = 1. Thus
applying Proposition 3, we conclude that Pe(z) ≥ P (z) for all wealth allo-
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cations if and only if it is valid for all two-class economies where θ follows a
two-point distribution. This proves the first result.
To prove the second result, noting that D(x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) = P (x)R(x) and
T (x) = 1
R(x)
, from (18), we have
De(z) = Pe(z)Re(z) =
Eθ[P (x(z, θ))R(x(z, θ))T 3(x(z, θ))]
[EθT (x(z, θ))]3
. (19)




. The rest of the proof is very
similar to the proof of the first statement; thus it is omitted for brevity.





2 = P (x)R(x) − 32R2(x), from (17) and (19), Se(z) =
Pe(z)Re(z)− 32R2e(x) is equal to








Eθ[(P (x(z, θ))R(x(z, θ))− 32R2(x(z, θ)))T 3(x(z, θ))]
[EθT (x(z, θ))]3
. (20)




. Again, the rest of the proof is
very similar to the proof of the first statement, and it is omitted for brevity.
Q.E.D.
From the above result, we can derive a sufficient condition for prudence to
be always increased by wealth inequality: ( 1P (x))
′′ ≤ 0; a sufficient condition
for u
′′′(x)




′′ ≤ 0; a
sufficient condition for the Schwarzian derivative S(x) to be always increased








There are many other cases where the results obtained in the last secion are
useful. We give the following examples.
1. Minising variance.
Given a random variable ˜, the variance of f(˜), a function of ˜, has the
form Ef2(˜)− (Ef(˜))2. Thus Proposition 3 is applicable to the problem of
minimizing the variance of f(˜) subject to linear constraints.
2. Maximizing Sharpe ratio.
Given an asset’s future price S, the Sharpe ratio of a derivative with
payoff c(S) has the form Ec(S)−r
Ec2(S)−(Ec(S))2 =
E(c(S)−r)
Ec2(S)−(Ec(S))2 , where r is the
risk-free interest rate. Thus Proposition 3 is applicable to the problem of
maximizing the Sharpe ratio of c(S) subject to linear constraints (assuming
Ec(S)≥ r).
3. Minimizing skewness and kurtosis.








. Thus Proposition 3 is applicable to the problem of minimizing the
skewness (if E˜3 ≥ 0) and kurtosis subject to linear constraints.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified a class of linearly constrained nonlinear
optimization problems with corner point optimal solutions. These include
some special polynomial fractional optimization problems which have an
objective function equal to the product of some power functions of positive
linear functionals subtracting the sum of some power functions of positive
linear functionals, divided by the sum of some power functions of positive
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linear functionals. The powers are required to be all positive integers, and
the aggregate power of the product is required to be no larger than the lowest
power of the two sums. This result has applications to many optimization
problems under uncertainty, particulary in finance.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
To show that if for all x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A, (2) is true then, for all x ∈ A, (1) is
true, given any x ∈ A, let x1 = ... = xs¯ = x in (2); we immediately obtain
(1). Thus we need only show that if for all x ∈ A, (1) is true then, for all
x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A, (2) is true.
Given any x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A, where s¯ = maxi{si}, let {j1, ..., jt} be a t-
combination of {1, ..., s¯}, where t = ∑mi=1 ti. There are C s¯t such combina-
tions. Denote the summation in the right hand side of (2) by Ξ. The sum
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i=1 ti = t and [
{j1, ..., jt}
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m
tm)
] denotes the set of all
t-permutations of {j1, ..., jt}, where the order of the elements in each pair
of the round brackets does not matter. Note that there are t!t1!...tm! such















Because the arithmetic mean of these t!t1!...tm! items is smaller than their
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Now let Ak,i denote the set of t-permutations of {j1, ..., jt} with jk in the
ith pair of square brackets. It is clear that the number of items in Ak,i is
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m
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] = ∪tk=1∪mi=1Ak,i. It















for each k ∈ {1, ..., t} and each i ∈ {1, ..., l}, the factor gi(xjk) appears



















































































13From the generalized Ho¨lder’s inequality, we have Πtj=1||fj||pj ≥ ||Πnj=1fj||r, where r ∈











In the special case where r = 1, p1 = ... = pt = t, when S = {1, ...,n}, applying the







Πtj=1aij, where for all i and j,
aij ≥ 0.
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For every t-combination (j1, ..., jt) of {1, ..., s¯} we do the following oper-
ation. We choose (si − t) numbers jt+1, ..., jsi from {1, ..., s¯} − {j1, ..., jt}.
There areC s¯−tsi−t different such choices in total. Now consider all t-combinations
of (j1, ..., jsi). There are C
si
t such t-combinations in total. For every such a
t-combination (k1, ..., kt) of {j1, ..., jsi}, we add a term [Πktj=k1 [fi(xj)]si ]
1
t to


























t times the original number of
terms in ∆i while every added term in ∆′i is actually one of the original
terms in ∆i. Note as the operation is symmetric w.r.t all the original terms,




In other words, if we allow all original terms to be repeated C s¯−tsi−tC
si
t
times and put them in a set, then this set of terms can be divided into groups
of Csit terms, and in every group all terms consist of the same si elements,
say {[fi(xj1)]
si
t , ..., [fi(xjsi )]
si
t }, chosen from {[fi(x1)]
si
t , ..., [fi(xs¯)]
si
t }, while
each of the si elements appears exactly C
si−1
t−1 times in the group. Such a
group of terms is said to be generated by the si elements. It is obvious that










For every such a group, there is a si-combination (j1, ..., jsi) of {1, ..., s¯}
which corresponds to the si elements {[fi(xj1)]
si
t , ..., [fi(xjsi)]
si
t } which gen-
erate the group. Let Θ be the set of all these si-combinations of {1, ..., s¯}
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corresponding to each of the groups. As there are C s¯−tsi−tC
s¯
t such groups,
there must be C s¯−tsi−tC
s¯
t such si-combinations in Θ. Now for every such a
group generated by si elements {[fi(xj1)]
si
t , ..., [fi(xjsi)]
si
t }, we apply the
result that the geometric mean of all the terms in the group is smaller than
their arithmetic mean. Noting that there are Csit terms in the group and
each of the si elements appears exactly C
si−1
t−1 times in the group, we obtain
















Thus the sum of all the C s¯−tsi−tC
s¯






jk), where Θ is the set of si-combinations of {1, ..., s¯} resulted from
the above operation. It is obvious that (
{1, ..., s¯}
j1, ..., jt
) ⊂ Θ. Moreover, as the
operation is symetric w.r.t the s¯ elements {1, ..., s¯}, each si-combination of
{1, ..., s¯} must be repeated by the same times. Furthermore, as there are
C s¯−tsi−tC
s¯
t elements in Θ while there are in total C
s¯
si different si-combinations
























































Substituting this into the right hand side of (2), we immediately obtain that
(2) is true for x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A. As x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A are arbitrarily given, we
conclude that (2) is true for all x1, ..., xs¯ ∈ A. Q.E.D.
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